Although the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem holds under a linear estate tax schedule, it fails to hold under a nonlinear estate tax schedule. In a representative consumer economy, a temporary lump-sum tax increase reduces contemporaneous consumption. If different consumers face different marginal estate tax rates because they leave bequests of different sizes, a lump-sum tax increase redistributes resources from consumers in low marginal estate tax brackets to consumers in high marginal estate tax brackets; aggregate consumption mey rise, , or remain unchanged. These departures from Ricerdian Equivalence hold more generally under any nonlinear tax on saving, wealth or income accruing to wealth.
family faces an infinite horizon problem when making his consumption and bequest decisions.
Therefore, any change in the path of lump-sum taxes which leaves the present value of taxes unchanged does not affect the infinite-horizon intertemporal budget constraint and hence does not affect the optimal path of consumption. Barro (1 g74) examined the effects of changes in the timing of lump-sum taxes in the presence of proportional inheritance taxes and concluded that "the existence of taxes on intergenerational transfers makes less likely an interior solution for the transfers, but if these transfers are operative, even if at reduced levels, the marginal effect of [changes in the timing of lump sum taxes) on consumption plans--and, hence, on r--remains nil." (p. 1 109) I will show below that this conclusion is incorrect, unless, as in Barro's formal analysis, the inheritance tax is a linear tax. However, most developed economies have a progressive tax on bequests, and the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem fails to hold in the presence of a nonlinear tax on bequests. Indeed, the presence of a nonlinear tax on any form of wealth, whether it is an intergenerational transfer or an individual's life-cycle saving, will lead to a violation of Ricac'dian Equivalence.
The literature on the aggregate implications of bequests contains models which display many important characteristics such as the endogeneity of the rate of return on savings (Buiter[ 1 979], Carmichael [1982] , Burbidge[ 1983) , Abel [1 985b]), the non-negativity constraint on bequests (Well [1 9841 ) end the uncertainty of the date of death (Abel 11 985a, b] ); virtually all models in this literature include the overlapping nature of generations. Although each of these features of the economy has important implications which merit study, the model presented below will ignore all of them. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate clearly, in as simple a model as possible, that a nonlinear tax on inheritances, bequests, wealth or property income destrnys the Ricardian Equivalence result. Furthermore, in a representative consumer framework, the direction of the departure from Ricardien Equivalence is unambiguous: with increasing marginal tax rates on inheritances, bequests, wealth or property income, a temporary tax increases reduces contemporaneous consumption.
The consumer's decision problem is presented in section I and the government budget constraint is presented in section II. Section III demonstrates that in a representative consumer economy with increasing marginal estate tax rates, an increase in the lump sum tax leads to a reduction in aggregate consumption. This effect arises because individual consumers are driven into lower marginal estate tax brackets and thus face a decrease in the price of their heirs' consumption relative to their own consumption. This relative price change leads to a decrease in current consumption. Section IV presents a second channel for the violation of Ricardian Equivalence: the cross-sectional variation in wealth implies that different consumers leave bequests of different sizes and hence face different marginal estate tax rates. An increase in the current lump-sum tax redistributes resources away from consumers in low marginal estate tax brackets to consumers in high marginal estate tax brackets; the effects on aggregate consumption are discussed in section IV.
Section V then argues that violation of Ricardian Equivalence arises more generally under any nonlinear tax on wealth or capital income. However, a nonlinear tax on labor income does not necessarily destroy Ricardian Equivalence as demonstrated in section VI. Concluding remarks are presented in section VII.
I. The Consumption Decision
Consider an economy which lasts for only two periods--denoted as periods I and 2. Individual consumers live for only one period. Each consumer who lives in period I has one child and this child is the consumer's only heir. Each consumer who lives during period i (1 = 1 , 2) receives an endowment 81, pays a lump-sum tax T, and consumes c1. Period 1 consumers obtain utility from the utility of their heirs as well as directly from their own consumption. We specify the utility function of period 1 consumers to have the additively separable form
where u(c1) is the utility that a consumer in period i obtains from consumption in period i, and 13 is a discount factor that a period 1 consumer 8pplies to the utility of his heir.
Let B denote the bequest left by a representative period 1 consumer so that B = e1-T1-c1
(2) Let R be the gross rate of return on assets( bequests). For simplicity, R is fixed exogenously. Let I denote the inheritance received by a period 2 consumer. Suppose that an estate tax t( B) is levied on the bequest B and that the marginal tax rate is non-negative, less than one, and is non-decreasing in B (that is, 0 t < 1 andt" 0). The inheritance received by the period 2 consumer is I = R[B-t(B)]. Because the period 2 consumer has no heirs, he consumes all of his available resources so that c2 = R[B-t(B)J + e2 -12 A period 1 consumer maximizes the utility function in (1) subject to the budget constraint obtained by substituting (2) into (3). The first-order condition for this maximization problem is
The consumer equates the utility from consuming an extra unit in period I with the utility from bequeathing an extra unit, thereby increasing his heirs consumption by (1 -t')R units.
The Government Budget Constraint
The Ricardian Equivalence Theorem is based on the fact that individual consumers recognize that the governments intertemporel budget constraint implies that en" r'hanqe in current taxes must be offset, in present value, by a change in future taxes. 1 If there are initially no government bonds outstanding, then the governmenVs intertemporal budget constraint can be written as RET1 + t(B)J + 12 = 0 (5) In the next section we analyze the effect on consumption of changes in the lump-sum taxes T1 end 12 which satisfy (6).
III. The Effect on Consumption of a Change in Lump-Sum Taxes
To calculate the effect of a lump-sum tax change on consumption, first observe from (2) that dc1 + (lB = -dT1 (7)
Thus either c1 or B (or both) must fall in response to an increase in the lump-sum tax T. Next,
Substituting the government budget constraint (6) into (8), and using (7), yields = -Rdc1
An individual consumer can, 8t the margin, increase c2 and reduce c1 in the ratio ( 1-t'(B))R;
however, in comparing the new equilibrium with the initial equilibrium,c1 and c2 change in the ratio R, which is the intertemporal price of c2 relative to c1 for the economy as a whole.2
To calculate the changes in c1 and c2, define 0(c) = -u"(c)/u(c)> 0. Logarithmically differentiating both sides of the first-order condition (4) yields
Using (7) to substitue for dB and (9) to substitute for dc2, equation (10) can be written as
wherethe inequalitiesin( 1 1)followfrom 0 t < 1, t" Oand z(c) >0. Itfollowsfrom (11) that if the estate tax is linear (t°=0), then Ricardian Equivalence holds. However, if the estate tax is characterized by a rising marginal rate, then an increase in the first-period lump-sum tax leads to a decrease in first-period consumption. The direction of the effect of the first-period tax on first-period consumption is the seine as would be predicted by a naive application of a "Keynesian" consumption function relating consumption to contemporaneous disposable income.
The intuition behind the failure of Ricardian Equivalence is straightforward. If Ricardian Equivalence were to hold so that c1 and c2 were invariant to the change in T , then an increase in I would reduce the bequest B and hence would reduce the marginal tax rate U, if t " > 0. The effect of the decrease in V is to increase the utility associated with decreasing c1 by one unit and increasing c2 by (1 -V )R units. Put differently, the effect of the decrease in V is to reduce the price of the heir's consumption relative to the consumer's own consumption. Hence, the consumer responds to this intertemporal price change by reducing c1 and increasing C2.
The reduction in c1 is smaller than the increase in T.. To understand this result, suppose that the reduction in c1 were equal to the increase in T. In this case, the bequest B would be unchanged end the intergenerational terms of trade (1 -t')R would be unchanged. But if the intergenerational terms of trade are unchanged, and lithe present value of taxes is unchanged, then the optimal response of c1 to the change in I is zero rather one-for-one.
The results implied by equation (11) are derived under the assumption that the estate tax isa twIce differentiable function of the bequest. owev, actual tax codes generally specify marginal tax rates (U) as step functions of the tax base. Thus, at any given tax base, the slope of the marginal tax function Ct") is either zero or' is undefined. Therefore, a literal interpretation of (11) may lead one to conclude (incorrectly) that the nonlinearity in actual tax codes does not destroy Ricardian Equivalence. However, Ricerdian Equivalence will fail to hold if, by maintaining current consumption unchanged, the representative consumer is driven into a lower (marginal) tax brdcket by the lump-sum tax increase. The greeter is the increase in the first-period tax, the greeter is the likelihood that the representative consumer will be driven into a lower marginal tax bracket.
IV. Cross-Sectional Variation in Initial Wealth
With a nonlinear estate tax schedule, there are two sources of variation in marginal tax rates To keep the analysis simple, we assume that the marginal tax rate schedule is a step function of the size of the bequest. Furthermore, we assume that the bequest left by each consumer is sufficiently far from the next tax bracket, and that the change in the lump-sum tax is sufficiently small, so that no consumers are driven into different tax brackets as a result of the tax change.
Formally, these assumptions imply that for the relevant values of the bequests, t"=O.
Suppose that all first-period consumers are identical in all respects except for the initial endowment e1. Suppose that there are J possible values of the first-period endowment ej , 4 = I ,... ,J. We will refer to a consumer who receives an endowment Si 1 as a type 4 consumer. Let Si denote the fraction of first-period consumers who are of type j , so that Z Si = 1. Equation (10) in section III holds for each type of consumer. Setting t" = 0, dividing (10) by z(c42) and using (7) and (8) to substitute for dc2 yields
where the subscript 4 denotes that a variable pertains to a type 4 consumer. Note that the lump-sum taxes T. and 12 are not subscripted by j because we are confining our attention to lump-sum tax policies which do not discriminate across consumers of different types.
The governments budget constraint in (5) must be modified to take account of the different estate tax payments by different types of consumers RET1 + jsjt(B)I + 12 = 0
Totally differentiating the government budget constraint (1 3) with respect to T , 12, and Bj ,and using the fact that X sj = 1, yields
Let dC1 = Z Sj thj 1 be the change in aggregate first-period consumption. It follows immediately from (12) 
If g(c) is constant, then it follows from (15) and the government budget constraint (14) that dC1 = 0. Although aggregate consumption is unchanged when z( c) is constant, the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem does not hold because an increase in 1 and the associated reduction in 12 redistribute resources from families with low marginal estate tax rates to families with high marginal estate tax rates. Therefore, consumers with high marginal tax rates increase their consumption and consumers with low marginal tax rates decrease their consumption.
In general, aggregate first-period consumption changes in response to a change in lump-sum taxes which obeys the government budget constraint. Since the coefficient of dcj 1 on the left hand side of (12) is positive, the sign of the right hand side of (12) is the same as the sign of dcj i. Substituting (7) into (12) we obtain
IfdT1 ' 0, then the right hand side of (16) is increasing in tf. Therefore, there exists aj such alternatively be interpreted as applying to an economy in which all consumers live for two periods and leave no bequests. In this case, the tax t( B) is to be interpreted as a tax on wealth or saving.
If we interpret the model presented above as applying to consumers who live for two periods, then it may be more relevant to interpret the results as applying to an economy with a nonlinear property income tax rather than a wealth tax, In this case, the variable B would be interpreted as saving at the end of the first period, and (R-1 )B is property income. Letting t* ( ( R-1 ) 
Using (9) to eliminate dc2 and (7) to eliminate dB, we obtain4
Recalling that 0 t < 1 and that t" 0, it follows from (1 9b) that 0(B) 0 with strict inequality if t > 0. Therefore, (20) implies that -1 < dc1 /dT1 0, with strict inequality if t'" > 0. Thus, for an economy with a representative consumer, the effects of lump-sum tax changes in the presence of a nonlinear property income tax are qualitatively the same as the effects in the presence of a nonlinear estate tax as thrived in section III.
Vi. Labor Income Taxes
It is well-known that changes in the structure of distortionary (non-lump-sum) taxes will affect the allocation of consumption. For example, Carmichael (1982) and Burbidge (1983) have each shown that if labor supply is a choice variable of individual consumers, then changes in the tax rate on labor income affect the allocation of consumption and output. The implication drawn by Burbidge (1983) is that government "debt is not neutr8l once one permits a labor-leisure choice to the young who pay taxes on their earnings." (p.226) However, if tax revenue is raised by both lump sum taxes and labor income taxes, then Burbidge's result must be modified: If the government finances a current tax cut by issuing bonds, then government debt will be neutral if the labor income tax schedule is unchanged. That is, changes in the timing of lump sum taxes have no effect on the allocation of consumption if the only other tax is a labor income tax. This result holds whether the labor income tax is linear or nonlinear.
To establish the modification of Burbidges result, let L be the labor supply of an individual in period i, and let w1 be the (exogenous) pre-tax real wage rate in period i so that w1L1 is labor income in period i. Then, letting tL(WL) be the labor income tax, and assuming that the only other tax is a head tax, we can modify equations (1) -(4) to write the maximization problem of a period 1 consumer as maxu*(c1,L1) + 13u*(c27L2) 
If RdT 1 + dT2 = 0, then it is both feasible and optimal for consumers to maintain the initial values of c1 and L. Because consumers continue to earn the same labor income and pay the same labor income taxes, the government budget constraint will be satisfied.
The analysis in this section illustrates that Ricardian Equivalence is not necessarily destroyed by the existence of (linear or nonlinear) labor income taxes if the government also has access to lump sum taxes. This finding is to be contrasted with the results in previous sections in which the existence of a nonlinear tax on wealth, saving, property income, inheritances or bequests leads to a violation of Ricardian Equivalence. The difference in the results is due to the fact that Ricardian Equivalence requires consumers to change their path of wealth accumulation to maintain unchanged consumption in the face of a tax change. If there is a nonlinear tax on wealth or income accruing to wealth, then changes in wealth accumulation will change intertemporal prices and render the initial allocation of consumption suboptimal. However, changes in the pattern of wealth accumulation have no effect on the price of leisure implied by the labor income tax.
VII. Conclusion
This paper has explored the implications of increasing marginal tax rates on bequests, inheritances, property income and wealth for the efficacy of lump-sum tax and transfer policies.
We demonstrated that the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem fails to hold in the presence of nonlinear taxes on bequests, inheritances, property income or wealth. It is important to note that the As explained in section V, the historical development of the literature has led to a strong link between Ricardian Equivalence and the existence of bequests motivated by intergenerational altruism. We have shown that the presence of a nonlinear tax on bequests destrs the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem. Moreover, it is not the nonlinear tax on bequests ,oer. which is important; Ricardian Equivalence will fail to hold whenever there is a nonlinear tax on saving or the income accruing to saving. The key question is whether a change in the timing of lump-sum taxes leads to an optimal intertemporal reallocation of consumption within the consumer's family.
If thera.is such.an optimal reallocation, then Ricardian Equivalence is violated regardless of whether the reallocation is across different generations of the family or across different periods of a consumers life.
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1. It is possible in an infinite-horizon modal for the government to reduce current taxes without having to increase future taxes at any date if the interest rate is smaller than the population growth rate. (See Barro( 1976) , Feldstein( 1976) and Carmicheel ( 1982)). This consideration does not arise in the two-period economy in this paper.
2. We have assumed that all consumers know the government budget constraint and correctly anticipate the second-period tax 12. However, we assume that individual consumers behave atom istically: in choosing B, individual consumers take Ti and 12 as parametrically given since no consumer is large enough to affect per capita revenues by his actions alone. If there were only one consumer in the economy, then his behavior would affect T and 12. In this case, substituting the government budget constraint (5) into the consumers budget constraint (from (2) and (3)) would yield c2 = R(e1 -c1) + 82, and Ricardian Equivalence would hold in this case with a single consumer.
Alternatively, the Ricerdian Equivalence Theorem would hold in the presence of lump-sum taxes if all families were effectively linked to one another by operative intergenerational transfers. Bernheim and Bagwell (1984) have argued that such linkages will be important because people from different families merry and have children. However, if one takes the Bernheim-Begwell results seriously, then not only are lump-sum taxes irrelevant, but the price system is also irrelevant. The implication which Bernheim and Bagwell draw from these overly strong results is that bequests must be generated by motives other than (possibly in addition to) altruism.
3. Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1984) isan interesting exception. (9) combining equations (f4. 1) end ((4.2) and using (7) yields (9).
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